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Three human rights myths serve to limit the debate over
human rights in the United States and bias our perspective
in dealing with the human rights claims of citizens from
other countries. The first myth is that human rights belong
solely to individuals and protect them largely from nega
tive actions by the state. The second myth declares that
civil and political rights are primary while economic,
cultural, and social rights are secondary. The third myth
asserts that the only rights that count are legal in nature
and that moral or personal claims are invalid or irrelevant.
Even a brief historical analysis reveals that all three myths
are just that-myths. The group rights of corporations are
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti
tution, economic rights have been upheld over political
claims as witness the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision,
and legal debates over rights have often obscured the
political, personal, and identity questions that many rights
arguments revolve around. Only a conception of human
rights that views them as the gradual empowerment of
people or groups or the deconcentration of power removes
them from the realm of an elite debate among experts and
allows for cross-cultural comparison and action.

The last 2S years have given rise to an explosion of human rights
demands. These demands, in turn, have produced many new laws,
organizations, and a library of scholarly works on human rights. In
fact, one author refers to a new "human rights industry" that has
sprung up. Belatedly, human rights education has emerged in the
school curriculum far beyond its usual place as a "current event" or
as an " Enlightenment idea. " However, in moving to a more central
place, human rights has created as much confusion as clarity. Who
Explorations in Ethnic Studies Vol.16, No.1 (January 1993): 75-83.

Explorations in Ethnic Studies Vol. 1 6, No. 1

are all of these special interests and how do we adjudicate between
their competing demands? What is the relationship between rights
and freedoms? Is there a clear-cut answer to the "hate speech"
debate? Have demands such as affirmative action some how gotten
away from the more "basic" rights embedded in our Constitution?
In a truly multicultural country and world, we must begin to clear
away some of the confusion surrounding human rights in the United
States and create a foundation on which we might build a more
coherent and equitable conception of human rights. To do this, we
must challenge the traditional conception of human rights embraced
by the United States government and many scholars and activists in
this country. This traditional view of human rights rests on at least
three myths. First, it sees rights only as individual claims against state
power. There are no rights between the state and groups even though
the United States may be the most group-oriented society in the
world. Second, partly as a result of history and partly as a result of
superpower politiCS, human rights in the US has come to mean
political and civil rights rather than economic and cultural rights.
The rise of "third world" claims and the deconstruction of the Soviet
Union have made this narrow view of rights increaSingly untenable.
Third, rights in the US tend to be seen as legal rather than moral or
political. That is, if one does not have recourse to legal action then
one is seen as not having a right in reality. This legal framework
extends to the international arena where all rights are seen as flowing
from the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
however, there is no acknowledged framework for prioritizing these
delineated rights.
The traditional way we view these rights in the United States
ignores the fact that this country has never been culturally or
religiously homogeneous and that its diversity has increased dramati
cally over the last century. The United States was first a multicultural
nation through conquest and then enslavement followed by immi
gration . Given this history, I believe that the phrase "human rights"
is best defined as the newly articulated demands for empowering
people who (because of poverty or discrimination) have suffered
deprivation or oppression. In a power theory of human rights,
demands (or claims) are made by persons, individually or in associa
tion with others, to get or keep the power to satisfy felt or perceived
needs. Frederick Douglass was asserting such a theory over 1 00 years
ago when he said: "Let me give you a word of the philosophy of
reform. The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows
that all concessions yet made to her august claims, have been born of
earnest struggle . . . . Power concedes nothing without a demand. It
never did and it never will. " I Power (or control) is simply the ability
to help cause effects. It is much more than might, or physical force.
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Love, religion, philosophy and law may all be sources of power. Their
use combines with other causal factors to produce unintended
consequences and by-products. Their legitimacy depends on the
depth and breadth of acceptance either through passive consent or
active support.2
The first myth, that rights obtain only to the relationship between
the individual and the state, helps delegitimize group-based claims.
This traditional individualistic view of rights is ironic given that the
development of the UN Declaration of Human Rights was grounded
in response to the oppression of a group Oews) by another group
(Aryans) . Without going into the enormous economic and cultural
differences within the US or between the US and any other country,
we must recognize that all humans are first and foremost individuals
in-groups. From birth onward, they are social animals. The "self" is
linked first with the mother and then with other "others. " lt is
influenced not only by heredity and the physical environment but
also by a cultural environment. Individual dignity and worth are
defined largely by multiple social roles and affiliation, that is, by
belonging to one or more communities of shared interests-a family,
household, gang, neighborhood, association, formal organization,
religion, ethnic or national group or even by identifying with a
uniform, flag, athletic team or media celebrity. The "rat race" in
corporate bureaucracies, as pointed out decades ago in The Organiza
tion Man, takes place in a collectivist cage.3 The long-term impact of
Soviet totalitarianism was the impairment of " a citizen's ability to act
constructively and cooperatively with fellow citizens. " As a Soviet
official explained it to Richard Schifter: "I spoke freely to my wife and
she spoke freely to me. We did not share our thoughts with any one
else . "4
An examination of the diplomatiC history between Native Ameri
can peoples and the US government would certainly seem to support
the argument that the rights of individuals reign supreme. How else
do we explain the nearly 500 broken treaties with American Indian
tribes? What motivates government policy to break-up tribes? How
can the sovereignty of tribal nations be ignored in legal and moral
terms? What role does race play in the group-centered demands of
Native Americans and African Americans? Are cultural or biological
definitions of race more persuasive in making rights claims? Indeed,
claims such as affirmative action and reparations make no sense
unless we recognize that government policy did recognize groups
rewarding some and punishing others. Perhaps the best example of
the legal recognition of groups is the corporation Moreover, the
recognition of the corporation as a "legal person" bestowed upon
them economic benefits that were often given priority over the
political and civil claims of individuals.
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The legislative history of the post-Civil War Fourteenth Amend
ment to the Constitution reveals that two members of the committee
that drafted the amendment, Representatives John Bingham and
Roscoe Conkling, a prominent Republican and successful railroad
lawyer, explained that they added the word "person" (in addition to
"citizen") not to help former slaves but to help protect "j oint stock
companies" from the oppression of state or local regulation, expro
priation, and "invidious and discriminating" taxes. Under a flood of
judicial decisions, the "fictive personality" of state-chartered corpo
rations became one of the fundaments under the towering structure
of corporate law.s Every corporation was thus entitled to all the
rights, including due process, at all levels of government, that the
constitution granted to mortals. Despite occasional dissents, these
rights have long been upheld.
With this due process protection against state government regu
lation and with massive government aid to corporate collectivities
through land grants, protective tariffs and other subsidies, Northern
industry expanded rapidly and the US began to emerge as a potential
Great Power. All this took place under the ideological umbrella of a
weak central government. For decades the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional many laws that limited the rights of large corpora
tions or, as Arthur Schlesinger puts it, to "counter the aggreSSions of
local maj orities on the rights of minorities and individuals. " 6 More
recently, the US has insisted that the right to private property be a part
of international human rights instruments.
The second human rights myth in the United States is that political
and civil rights should be given priority over economic and cultural
rights. This myth prevails even though the right to private property
(which runs counter to the conceptions of land ownership held by
the original inhabitants of this country) is certainly an economic
right. A recent example of the priority attached to this position
comes from the introduction to the State Department's Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1 990 by Richard Schifter:
In applying these internationally recognized stan
dards, we seek to be obj ective. But the reports
unashamedly reflect the U.S. view that government
is legitimate only when grounded on the consent of
the governed, and that government thus grounded
should not be used to deny life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness . . . . We have found that the
concept of economic, social, and cultural rights is
often confused, sometimes willfully, by repressive
governments claiming that, in order to promote
these "rights, " they may deny their citizens the rights
to integrity of the person as well as political and civil
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rights. If these basic rights are not secured, experience has shown, the goals of economic development
are not reached either . . . . From this premise, that
basic human rights may not be abridged or denied, it
follows that our human rights policy is concerned
with the limitations on the powers of government
that are required to protect the integrity and dignity
of the individuaL7
It is certainly true that US human rights policy has been concerned
with limiting the powers of government. However, it is a myth that
this policy placed individual political and civil rights first. Perhaps
the greatest challenge to this myth occurred in 1 8 5 7 in the Dred Scott
decision of the US Supreme Court. Dred Scott, a slave, had been taken
by his master to live in Illinois, a free state, and later in the Louisiana
territory north of 3 6° 30' in which slavery had been prohibited by the
Missouri Compromise of 1 820. After his return to Missouri, Scott
sued in Federal Court to obtain his freedom on the ground that he had
resided in "free territory" and was thus entitled to his freedom (citing
English common law) . In its decision, the Supreme Court stated that
historically blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect" and therefore blacks had been denied citizenship . 8 Thus,
Dred Scott lacked " legal standing" before the courts. However, the
Supreme Court went beyond denying Scott citizenship rights to
assert that congress had no authority to deprive a citizen "from
holding and owning property of this kind [slaves] in the territory
mentioned in the Compromise or in any place in the United States. "9
In Dred Scott the civil and political rights of blacks in even free states
was submerged beneath the economic rights of slave masters to own
human property.
The debate over the Dred Scott decision illustrates the final myth
about human rights-that they are natural or " God-given. " Aside from
the theological questions this view raises, it also tends to obscure the
political context of rights. A top-down view of rights that sees them
only as a struggle between the individual and the state artificially
separates the public sphere from the private. Every right involves a
political and social struggle and these struggles by individuals and
groups to control their lives are more than simple protection from the
power of a monarch or a centralized government. It is the power of
women and children to gain some control over their lives in the
family as well as the right of a union to organize. While court
decisions or UN Conventions may help legitimate certain rights
claims, governments cannot guarantee rights. Only the actual
struggle over responsibilities and remedies will determine which
among competing claims are met. In this struggle, moral and
political norms provide the framework in which legal decisions are
made and legislation is passed.
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Only by understanding the political context of the human struggle
can one explain the failure of the United States to ratify the basic
human rights instruments. Throughout the 1 950s and 1 9 60s a
common theme of the opposition involved the fear that interna
tional pressure would force the granting of political and civil rights
to national minorities in this country. Thus, the president of the
American Bar Association, Frank Holman, could state the following:
"I pointed out that if, in driving me from the airport, [someone] had
unfortunately run over a Negro child running out into the street in
front of him, what would have been a local offense under a charge of
gross negligence or involuntary manslaughter would, under the
Genocide Convention, because of the racial differential, not be a local
crime but an international crime and that [he] could be transported
someplace overseas for trial. " 10 The long-term success of the forces
opposed to ratification of the UN conventions and covenants in the
US is at least in part measured by their success in framing the debate
over human rights treaties in legal rather than moral terms.
This formalistic approach to rights is complemented by our as
sumption that rights are public rather than private. Such a distinc
tion is evident when we label violence that occurs in the home
" domestic" and thus attach less severe or no penalties to those who
perpetrate such acts. The modern women's movement has done
much to break down the barriers between the personal and the
political. Yet many of these activists are often drawn into abstract
debates on rights rather than the substance of specific demands for
empowerment. In the case of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), for
example, the anti-ERA forces mobilized their constituents far more
effectively than did their opponents around the politicizing of
personal issues. The ERA's abstract nature and indeterminate lan
guage lacked the impulse of an urgent issue and left the door open for
distorted claims about possible future interpretations by the Supreme
Court. 1 1 However, that is not to say that the campaign for ratification
was without positive education effects for women and men.
The tendency for the human rights struggles to get caught up in
abstract, legalistic arguments hides the moral bases of law which are
essential to building mass movements. Martin Luther King's great
appeal was as a moral leader and not as a legal scholar or legislator.
His appeal to higher "natural law" as reflected in the "Letter from
Birmingham Jail" represents the most eloquent statement of the
spirit of the civil rights movement. 12
Yet this appeal to higher law can work both ways as evidenced by
the wide-spread disrespect for law and order in the South following
the Brown decision in 1954. At the same time, there exists in
American legal culture a quite different tendency: a desire to regulate
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human behavior tyrannically by means of formal laws. Over fifty
years ago, Gunnar Myrdal cited this tendency as a remnant of early
American Puritanism which was sometimes fanatical and dogmatic
and always had a strong inclination to mind other people's business.
Thus, according to Myrdal, " [t] o demand and legislate all sorts of laws
against this or that is just as much a part of American freedom as to
disobey the laws when they are enacted. " "America, " he says, "has
become a country where exceedingly much is permitted in practice
but at the same time exceedingly much is forbidden in law. " 13
Myrdal's discussion of these conflicting tendencies in American
law helps explain why Americans have come to place so much
emphasis on "the letter of the law" as opposed to its spirit. I 4 How else
can we explain why the federal government is forced to carry out
important social legislation like the 1 964 Civil Rights Act under the
fiction that it is regulating "interstate commerce, " or that federal
prosecuting agencies punish dangerous gangsters for income tax
evasion rather than for the felonies they have committed.
Myrdal contends that Americans now have a judicial order that
runs counter to their basic idealistic inclinations. The American
creed as Myrdal delineated it in An American Dilemma included
liberty, equality, individualism, democracy and rule of law under a
constitution. More recently, Samuel Huntington has argued that this
American Creed forms the basis for our national identity which is
political rather than cultural. In a country as heterogeneous as the
United States it is not surprising that our identity would flow from
political ideals rather than cultural reality.
This peculiar political identity, however, has a number of conse
quences. American identity, for example, is defined in normative
terms, French identity in existential terms. French political behavior,
in this sense, is whatever the French in fact do in politics; American
political behavior, on the other hand, is what American political
ideals say Americans ought to do in politics. This external standard by
which to judge the legitimacy of American political practice and
institutions provides a basis to challenge the status quo. IS
Of course, the problem with the American Creed as a standard of
evaluation is that it contains conflicting values. It is not a systematic
ideology in the European sense. There is no theory for ordering these
values or resolving conflict among them. Hence, we are back to our
original questions. Whose rights do we uphold-those who wish to
engage in free speech or those who wish to be protected from hate and
intimidation? In fact, as our three myths demonstrate, power is the
instrument used to resolve conflict.
The political character of our national identity helps explain
much of our bias in approaching international human rights. We
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tend to distrust authority, promote individual liberty and political
rights over economic equality and group rights. Yet, as we have seen,
our idealism has often masked a practice that promotes the rights,
including economic rights, of some groups over others. Our ten
dency to engage in extended legal debates over " the letter of the law"
.a1so hides the moral basis of our actions and removes them from the
realm of popular discourse.
Many rights are "universal" ideals in the sense of being widely
accepted by elites in the world community, although violated in
practice and unknown to most people in the world. By focusing on
human rights as the gradual empowerment of people or the
deconcentration of power, we move away from the conception of
rights that views them as a public contract between the individual
and the state rather than the private relationships within families or
between groups . In the words of Nobel Laureate Ralph Bunche during
World War II: "As members of a disadvantaged minority in this
society, we must recognize clearly that we are forced to fight on two
fronts. We must struggle to win our share of the blessings of life in a
democratic society and we must join with the rest of the nation in a
whole-hearted fight to preserve the democratic framework and ideals
of this society. It is only when the latter fight is won that the former
can ever again have real meaning. " 1 6
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